

Mid Term Exam (MTE) will be held on 6-th of November, at 13:30 contactly in 506 a.
Please participate with your own computers with installed Octave and .m files.

During the MTE you must solve 2 problems:

1. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol - DH KAP.
2. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MiMA) for Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol - DH KAP.

The problems are presented in the site:

imimsociety.net

In section 'Cryptography':

[Cryptography \(imimsociety.net\)](http://imimsociety.net/Cryptography)

Please register to the site and after that you receive 10 Eur virtual money to purchase the problems.
For registration you should input the first 2 letters of your Surname and full Name, e.g. John Smith
Should register as **Sm John**.

Please purchase the only one problem at a time.

If the solution is successful then you are invited to press the green button [**Get reward**].

No any other declaration about the solution results is required.

If the solution failed, then you must press the button [Return] in the top on the left side.

Then 'Knowledge bank' will pay you the sum twice you have paid.

So, if the initial capital was 10 Eur of virtual money and you buy the problem of 2 Eur, then if the solution is correct your budget will increase up to 12 Eur.

You can solve the problems in imimsociety as many times as you wish to better prepare for MTE.

I advise you to try at first to solve the problem in 'Intellect' section to exercise the brains.

It is named as 'WOLF, GOAT AND CABBAGE TRANSFER ACROSS THE RIVER ALGORITHM'.

< <http://imimsociety.net/en/home/15-wolf-goat-and-cabbage-transfer-across-the-river-algorithm.html> >

The questions concerning the MTE you can ask at the end of the lectures.



Principles of Public Key Cryptography

Instead of using single symmetric key shared in advance by the parties for realization of symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography uses two **mathematically** related keys named as private key and public key we denote by **PrK** and **PuK** respectively.

PrK is a secret key owned *personally* by every user of cryptosystem and must be kept secretly. Due to the great importance of **PrK** secrecy for information security we labeled it in red color. **PuK** is a non-secret *personal* key and it is known for every user of cryptosystem and therefore we labeled it by green color. The loss of **PrK** causes a dramatic consequences comparable with those as losing password or pin code. This means that cryptographic identity of the user is lost. Then, for example, if user has no copy of **PrK** he get no access to his bank account. Moreover his cryptocurrencies are lost forever. If **PrK** is got into the wrong hands, e.g. into adversary hands, then it reveals a way to impersonate the user. Since user's **PuK** is known for everybody then adversary knows his key pair (**PrK**, **PuK**) and can forge his Digital Signature, decrypt messages, get access to the data available to the user (bank account or cryptocurrency account) and etc. Let function relating key pair (**PrK**, **PuK**) be F . Then in most cases of our study (if not declared opposite) this relation is expressed in the following way:

$$\text{PuK} = F(\text{PrK}): \quad \text{PrK} = x = \text{randi}(p-1); \quad \text{PuK} = a = g^x \bmod p.$$

In open cryptography according to **Kerchoff principle** function F must be known to all users of cryptosystem while security is achieved by secrecy of cryptographic keys. To be more precise to compute **PuK** using function F it must be defined using some parameters named as public parameters we denote by **PP** and color in blue that should be defined at the first step of cryptosystem creation. Since we will start from the cryptosystems based on discrete exponent function then these public parameters are

$$\text{PP} = (p, g).$$

Notice that relation represents very important cause and consequence relation we name as the direct relation: when given **PrK** we compute **PuK**.

Let us imagine that for given F we can find the inverse relation to compute **PrK** when **PuK** is given. Abstractly this relation can be represented by the inverse function F^{-1} . Then

$$\text{PrK} = F^{-1}(\text{PuK}).$$

In this case the secrecy of **PrK** is lost with all negative consequences above. To avoid these undesirable consequences function F must be **one-way function** – **OWF**. In this case informally OWF is defined in the following way:

1. The computation of its direct value **PuK** when **PrK** and F in are given is effective.
2. The computation of its inverse value **PrK** when **PuK** and F are given is infeasible, meaning that to find F^{-1} is infeasible.

The one-wayness of F allow us to relate person with his/her **PrK** through the **PuK**. If F is 1-to-1, then the pair (**PrK**, **PuK**) is unique. So **PrK** could be reckoned as a unique secret parameter associated with certain person. This person can declare the possession or **PrK** by sharing his/her **PuK** as his public parameter related with **PrK** and and at the same time not revealing **PrK**.

So, every user in asymmetric cryptography possesses key pair (**PrK**, **PuK**). Therefore, cryptosystems based on asymmetric cryptography are named as **Public Key CryptoSystems** (PKCS).

We will consider the same two traditional (canonical) actors in our study, namely Alice and Bob.

Everybody is having the corresponding key pair (**PrK_A**, **PuK_A**) and (**PrK_B**, **PuK_B**) and are exchanging with their public keys using open communication channel as indicated in figure below.



$$\text{PP} = (p, g).$$

Strong prime number p in real cryptography is of order : $p \sim 2^{2048}$


Strong prime number p in our examples is of order: $p \sim 2^{28}$

>> $p = \text{genstrongprime}(28)$


Key generation

- Randomly choose a private key x with $1 < x < p - 1$.
- The private key is **PrK** = $x = \text{randi}(p-1)$

Compute $a = g^x \bmod p$




- The private key is $\text{PrK} = x = \text{randi}(p-1)$
Compute $a = g^x \bmod p$.
- The public key is $\text{PuK} = a = g^x \bmod p$.




Asymmetric Encryption - Decryption
 $c = \text{Enc}(\text{PuK}_A, m) = (\epsilon, \delta) = (E, D)$
 $m = \text{Dec}(\text{PrK}_A, c)$

Asymmetric Signing - Verification
 $\sigma = \text{Sign}(\text{PrK}_A, m) = (r, s)$
 $V = \text{Ver}(\text{PuK}_A, m, \sigma), V \in \{\text{True}, \text{False}\} \equiv \{1, 0\}$



Authenticity



Confidentiality

1. Identification.

If person can prove that he/she knows PrK corresponding to his/her PuK without revealing any information about PrK then everybody can trust that he is communicating with person possessing (PrK, PuK) key pair. This kind of proof is named as **Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP)** and plays a very important role in cryptography. It is very useful to realize Identification, Digital Signatures and many other cryptographically secure protocols in internet. In many cryptographic protocols, especially in identification protocols PrK is named as **witness** and PuK as a **statement** for PrK . Every actor is having the corresponding key pair $(\text{PrK}_A, \text{PuK}_A)$ and all PuK are exchanged between the users using open communication channel as indicated in figure below.

Let Bob is sure that PuK_A is indeed of Alice and wants to tell Alice that he intends to send her his photo with chamomile flowers dedicated for Alice. But he wants to be sure that he is communicating only with Alice itself and with nobody else. He hopes that at first Alice will prove him that she knows her secret PrK_A using **ZKP** protocol. In general, this protocol is named as **Identification protocol**, it is interactive and has 3 communications to exchange the following data named as **commitment**, **challenge** and **response**.

Registration phase: Bank generates $\text{PrK}_A = x$ and $\text{PuK}_A = a$ to Alice and hands over this data in smart card, or in other crypto chip in Alice's smart phone, or in software for Smart ID.


Schnorr Id Scenario: Alice wants to prove Bank that she knows her Private Key - $\text{PrK}_A = x$ which corresponds to her Public Key - $\text{PuK}_A = a$ not revealing PrK_A : Zero Knowledge Proof - ZKP Protocol execution between Alice and Bank has time limit.

Alice's computation resources has a limit --> protocol must be computationally effective. $\text{PrK}_A = x$ is called a **witness** and corresponding $\text{PuK}_A = a = g^x \bmod p$ is called a **statement**. This protocol is initiated by Alice and has the following three communications.

$P(x, a)$ - Prover - Alice

$V(a)$ - Verifier - Bank

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Schnorr Identification: Zero Knowledge Proof - ZKP $PP = (p, g)$.

Schnorr Id is interactive protocol, but not recurrent as it is realized to prove the knowledge of miracle words.

Schnorr Id Scenario: Alice wants to prove Bank that she knows her Private Key - $\text{PrK}_A = x$ which corresponds to her Public Key - $\text{PuK}_A = a = g^x \bmod p$ not revealing $\text{PrK}_A = x$.

$\mathcal{A}$: Prover $P(x, a)$
ZKP of knowledge $\text{PrK} = x$:

1. Computes commitment


t for random number i :

$$i = \text{randi}(p-1)$$

$$t = g^i \bmod p$$

3. Computes response res :

$$res = i + xh \bmod (p-1)$$



Correctness:

$$g^{res} \bmod p = g^{i+xh \bmod (p-1)} \bmod p = g^i g^{xh} \bmod p = t(g^x)^h \bmod p = ta^h \bmod p.$$

Schnorr Signature Scheme (S-Sig).

In general, to create a signature on the message of any finite length M parties are using cryptographic secure H-function (message digest).

In Octave we use H-function

```
>> hd28('...') % the input '...' of this function represents a string of symbols between the commas.
                % the output of this function is decimal number having at most 28 bits.
```

Let M be a message in string format to be signed by **Alice** and sent to **Bob**: $M = \text{'Hello Bob'}$

For signature creation **Alice** uses public parameters $PP = (p, g)$ and

Alice's key pair is $PrK_A = x$, $PuK_A = a = g^x \bmod p$.

Alice chooses at random u , $1 < u < p-1$ and computes first component r of his signature:

$$r = g^u \bmod p. \quad (2.19)$$

Alice computes H-function value h and second component s of her signature:

$$h = H(M || r), \quad (2.20)$$

$$s = u + xh \bmod (p-1). \quad (2.21)$$

Alice's signature on h is $\sigma = (r, s)$. Then **Alice** sends M and σ to **Bob**.

After receiving M' and σ , **Bob** according to (2.20) computes h'

$$h' = H(M' || r),$$

and verifies if

$$g^s \bmod p = r a^{h'} \bmod p. \quad (2.22)$$

$$V1 = V2$$

Symbolically this verification function we denote by

$$\text{Ver}(a, \sigma, h') = V \in \{\text{True}, \text{False}\} = \{1, 0\}. \quad (2.23)$$

This function yields **True** if (2.22) is valid if: $h = h'$ and $PuK_A = a = F(PrK_A) = g^x \bmod p$.

and: $M = M'$

Alice: 'Hello Bob'

```
>> M='Hello Bob'
```

$M; \sigma = (r, s); a$



$M'; \sigma = (r, s); a$

Bank: let $M' = M$.

1. Computes $h = H(M || r)$.

```
>> h=concat(M,r)
```

2. Verifies signature on h .

$$g^s \bmod p = r a^h \bmod p.$$

$$V1 = V2$$

Correctness:

$$g^s \bmod p = g^{u+xh \bmod (p-1)} \bmod p = g^u g^{xh} \bmod p = r (g^x)^h \bmod p = r a^h \bmod p.$$

Non-Interactive ZKP — NIZKP

$A: u \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathbb{Z}_{p-1})$

$$r = g^u \bmod p$$

$$h = H(a || r) \quad // \text{Ethereum Keccak-256}$$

$$s = u + xh \bmod (p-1)$$

$B: PuK_A = a$

Verifies if

$$g^s = r a^h \bmod p$$

$$V1 = V2$$

